Introduction
The macroeconomic literature on gênerai equilibrinm with monopolistic compétition has heavily relied on the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model. The solu tion procédure of the latter is known to involve an approximation, in that each firm is assumed not to perceive the effect of its own price décisions on the aggregate price index. The implications of this "negligibility hypothesis" hâve recently been discussed in a number of papers (Yang and Heijdra, 1993; Dixit and Stiglitz,1993; D'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet, 1996) , the focus of which is on identifying closed solutions of the model, and determining the equilibrium number of firms. The aim of this paper is to investigate the rôle of the price-index effect in a gênerai equilibriurn macroeconomic perspective, with particular emphasis on the inefficiency of aggregate outcomes.]
It is by now a well established resuit, that gênerai equilibrium inter actions magnify the partial equilibrium inefficiency of iinperfect compéti tion, through aggregate demand externalities (e.g., Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987) : since any single firm shares with ail other firms the benefits (in terms of higlier aggregate demand) of a réduction of its own price, non-cooperative equilibria arise, which are Pareto-dominated by coopérative outcomes with higher levels of production and demand. However, when this resuit is obtained within the framework of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic compétition, an * C. Benassi acknowledges financial support from the University of Bologna 1 The relevance of the price index effect in defining the optimal targets for monetary policy has been sludied by Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) , while the rôle of the price index effect in the analysis of income taxation has been emphasized by Wu and Zhang (2000) . additional inefficiency is added to the inefficiency of the Nash solution, due to firrns neglecting the priée index effect : not only each agent chooses his price by taking as given the other agents' priées, but lie does not consider the effect of his own price on the aggregatc price -though the latter enters the relevant behavioural relations, through both the relative price, and the real aggregate demand levels.
When the coopération problem is studied in inodels where the price index approximation is adoptée!, one of the conséquences is that the size of the macroeconomic inefficiency, and hence the potential incentive to cooperate, turns ont to be in fact independent of the number of agents -a resuit which is somewhat disappointing. In this paper, we show that the explicit considération of the price index effect in the agents' décisions allovvs to specify a correct measure of the inefficiency due to non-cooperative behaviour, a measure which turns out to be positively correlated to the number of agents.2 This is consistent with the intuition that in the présence of aggregate demand externalities, any agent's awareness of the aggregate implications of his own décisions is stronger, the smaller is the number of agents.3 In a gênerai equilibrium perspective, a sort of reversai of the Cournotion convergence theorem must hold.
Moreover, the Dixit-Stiglitz approach to monopolistic compétition lias been the theoretical set-up for addressing some basic issues in macroecono mic (New Keynesian) analysis, such as nominal rigidity and the real effeets of inonetary policy. One implication of our model is that also the degree of nominal rigidity and the welfare effeets of nominal shocks dépend on the number of agents. In the paper we show that the inclusion of the price index effect reduces the scope for nominal rigidity, and decieases the welfare effect of monetary shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we sum up a simple monopolistic compétition macroeconomic model, and compare its standard Dixit-Stiglitz solution to the non-approximate solution. Section 3 ad dresses the issue of nominal rigidity and its aggregate implications. Some conclu sions are gathered in section 4.
2
The consumer-producer model : alternative solutions Our référence model is the well known consumer-producer model with mo nopolistic compétition, introduced by Romer (1989, 1990 ) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch.8) . The economy is populated by N agents, each of whom is the only producer, by means of his own labour, of a differentiated commodity which enters symmetrically the consumption bundle of ail agents. We recall the basic éléments of this model. The utility function of any agent i is :
( 1) where Lj is labour supplied and Cj is the consumption bundle, defîned by a CES sub-utility function :
where Qj is the amount of good j consumed by agent i. The production function is assumed to be linear in labour :
As a consumer, each agent i maximizes his utility with respect to ail Cy's. We aggregate individual demand functions over ail agents, and assume that the transaction technology imposes that (per capita) nominal money spending equals the (per capita) nominal money stock, M = PC, where C = (l/N)J2Ci is average consumption. Then the following market demand for each good j is obtained : (3) where P is the dual price index :
By substituting (2) into (1) and making use of the budget constraint, C, {Pi/P) Yi, we get the following indirect utility function This is the objective function which agent i, as a producer, maximizes with the respect to the nominal price P,: subject to the demand constraint given by (3) .
2.1
The approximate solution
The standard solution to tins model neglects the so called "priée index effect", that is, Pi is chosen under the assumption that P be given, i.e.
unaffected by P,. Under symmetry, tins approximation entails the following equilibrium values of the aggregate price level P and the level of output Yj = Y, produced by each agent i :
Of course, the efficient price-equal-marginal cost rule would entail a higher output and a lower P :
The exact solution
Let us consider an alternative solution to the producer's maximization problem, which is obtained once the effect of P, on the aggregate (average) price P is taken into account. Maximization of (4) entails the following first order condition :
where sp = (dP/dPi)/(Pi/P) is the elasticity of the aggregate price index with respect to P» and ed = {dY?fdPi)f{Pi/Yf) = [cr(l -ep) + £p], from (3). Consider now the ratio (1 -ep)/sd-The denominator is demand elasti city; notice that e(i takes hère into account the effects of P» on the relative price, both directly (<r) and through the price index (asp), as well as on the real inoney balances (ep).4 The numerator captures the effect of an increase in Pt; on the price of the consumption bundle, which represents for agent i as a consumer tlie reward for the labour lie supplies. In tins sensé, the corisumer-producer model accounts neatly for ail gênerai equilibrium implications of any agent's 'individu al décisions. The ratio (1 -sp)/s(i is therefore a measure of the desired price rnargin over marginal cost, which takes into account the effect of an}7 change in the agent's price not only on his demand, but also on his purchasing power in terms of the overall consumption bundle. Evaluating thèse elasticities in the symmetric equili brium, ep = e* = \/N and ed = e*d = er[l -(1/N)] + (1/N), we obtain the equilibrium values of P ancl Y :
M v<»-i)(i-*)+*;
For any finite value of TV, including the price index effect implies a higher equilibrium level of Y and a lower P, with respect to the model's standard solution. More precisery, it is easy to check that we recover the efficient solution for TV approaching 1, and the standard solution as N approaches infinity. Although thèse convergence properties are clearly not unexpected, they carry with thein some noteworthy implications.
Following a standard practice, we can characterize the macroeconomic inefficiency associated with monopolistic compétition in ternis of the output gap between the equilibrium and the efficient solutions. In the (standard) approximate solution, this gap is actually independent of N. This is somehow unsatisfactory, as one would expect that an inefficiency driven by demand-externality should dépend on the agents' ability to perceive the gênerai equilibrium implications of their choices -something which is in principle related to the number of agents. However, the approximate solu tion fails to convey this important point, since there the inefficiency results from the combined effect of (a) the non-cooperative behaviorir implied by the decentralized décision making, and (b) the myopie behaviour implitit in disregarding the price index effect. Once the latter is arnended for, the inef ficiency due purely to lack of coopération is fully brought out as positively related to the number of agents.
3
The price index effect and nominal rigidity
As is well known. the aggregate inefficiency generated by optimal individual choices is the key property, which made the model sketched above a most appropriate framework for the study of nominal rigidities. Since both the individual pricing rule and the degree of aggregate inefficiency are affectée! by the price index effect, the private incentive towards inertial behaviour and its macroeconomic conséquences should be re-assessed in the light of this effect -as also should the possibility that both rigidity and flexibility be self-sustaining non-cooperative equilibria.
Private loss, welfare and nominal rigidity
Small monetary shocks entail no private loss from nominal inertia, while the aggregate equilibrium being sub-optimal implies that this inertia lias first order effects on aggregate variables. By applying the définition of social gain (loss) from non adjustment (as a proportion of the initial output), dV/Y = {dV/dM) dM/Y evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain for the non approximate solution :
the coefficient of which is lower than 1/a and collapses to it as N tends to infinity. As expected, the measure of the welfare gain (loss) of nominal iner tia is given by the degree of monopoly power, which in our case lias already been shown to be lower than in the approximate case. In the présence of nominal rigidity, our flexible solution being closer to the efficient one makes aggregate welfare less sensitive to nominal disturbances.
Large shocks require an explicit évaluation of the private loss C from non adjustment, to be comparai with the menu cost.5 Recall that, when measured in terms of the initial output, C evaluated by a second order ïaylor Notice that the coefficient of \{dM/M)2 in C tends to its standard (approxiriiate solution) ralue [(a -l)(a -l)2/(a<r -a + 1)] as AT tends to infinity. To compare C with the latter for différent values of N, we assign to a and a the benchmark values suggested by Dixon and Hansen (1999) , a = 6 and a -4, in which case the approximate value of the coefficient is 3.5714. The convergence to this value is plotted in Figure 1 .
The intuition for the private loss to be Systematically higher under the exact solution is the following. By non-adjusting priées agents give up 5 The procedu re for the évaluation of the private loss from inertial behaviour and its aggregate conséquences is fully worked out in Benassi, Chirco and Colombo (1994, ch.7). 3.75-• 3.65-3.55-not only the opportunity of changing their desired relative price directly, but also the possibility of counteractiiig (via their own price change) the aggregate shock they perceive in real money balances, given the inertial behaviour of ail other agents. Therefore, a full awareness of the aggregate implications of individual décisions narrows the scope for rigidity to be an equilibrium solution of the model : the size of the menu cost required to induce inertia is higher, the lower is the number of price-making agents.
The social gain (loss) from large monetary shocks under price rigidity, evaluated by a second order Taylor expansion at the symmetric flexible
The coefficient of first order term coincide with (6) ; therefore it is lower than in the standard case, and is increasing in Ar;the coefficient of the second order term is higher than its approximate counterpart, and is decreasing in N. By applying to (7) the same parameter values considered above, the overall effect of a positive shock on M is a social gain, which is in fact increasing in N and converges to its approximate value from below.
3.2
Multiplicity of equilibria As Bail and Romer (1991) point out, tho présence of menu cost may be consistent with both price rigidity and price flexibility being Nash equilibria. For tins multiplicity resuit to émerge, the size of the menu cost must be greater than the private loss from non adjustment when ail other agents do not adjust, and smaller than the private loss from non adjustment when ail other agent do adjust their priées. In section 3.1 we hâve shown that for reasonable parameter values, the private loss from non adjustment in the first case is higher hère than in the standard case. As for the private loss from rigidity when the other agents adjust, tins is now :
For the same parameter values, this expression is lower than its approximate équivalent, to which it converges from below as N tends to infinity. Again, it is not difficult to capture the économie intuition of this behaviour. Any agent is now aware of his rôle in defining the aggregate price; therefore lie perceives that adjustment from ail other agents does not imply full adjustment of the aggregate price and real money balances. This makes for him less costly to refrain from changing his own price, when ail other agents do change theirs.
As a conséquence, the range of menu cost values which support multiplicity of equilibria. (sticky and flexible priées) shrinks -a resuit which, in the spirit of Bail and Romer, can be interpreted as a réduction of the scope for coordination failures.
4
Concluding remarks
The idea that imperfect compétition makes for lower activity levels lias of course been kiiown for a long time;the New Keynesian literature highlighted that gênerai equilibrium interactions niagnify this inemeiency, and offered an interprétation of the latter in ternis of endogenous insufîicient aggregate demand. Within this framework, this paper deals with the following question : is the efficiency gap driven by imperfect compétition larger, when few agents are endowed with market power, or rather is it larger when market power is widely spread across traders ? More generally, how does the number of décision makers affect the incentive to internalize macroeconomic externalities ?
The standard référence model on aggregate demand externality -the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic compétition -yields the disappointing resuit that the number of interacting agents is immateiïal. In tins paper we hâve shown that this is due to the Dixit-Stiglitz approximation neglecting the so-called price-index effect. Once the latter is allowed for, the macroe conomic inemeiency turns out to be positively correlated with the number of agents. Moreover, including the price-index effect narrows the scope for New Keynesian outcomes, such as optimal nominal rigidity and multiplicity of (flexible vs inertial) equilibria.
We believe that thèse resuit, though simple, may provide some useful insights. On the one hand, from a normative perspective, one should expect the aggregate size of policy measures based on externality-internalizing mechanisms (e.g., Agell and Dillén, 1994) to be smaller, the smaller the number of agents. On the other hand, reasoning along the theoretical Unes suggested in the paper may offer some perspective on the rnuch debated problem of high unemployment in Europe. It is well known that many European countries hâve historically experienced a corporatist structure of économie relations, which brings about a widely spread, rent generating market power. Though at a very high level of generality, the paper may give some theore tical support to the idea that this peculiar structure of économie relations is likely to amplify the négative macroeconomic extemalities of rent-seeking behaviour.
